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Introduction
The ongoing internationalization of product and labor markets has stimulated a lively debate about the pros and cons of globalization. Supporters often stress the beneficial effects that arise due to increased export opportunities, whereas globalization's detractors are usually more concerned about job losses due to heightened competition from so-called low-income countries. Economics can contribute to this debate in that it can rationalize the fear that more intensive global economicinterdependency generates by identifying the merits and downsides of this process and by quantifying the labor market outcomes of the potentially opposing effects.
The public debate that surrounds these issues has frequently been characterized by a lack of clarity regarding the definition of globalization and a failure to account for different elements of this process which may have contrasting implications for domestic and international labor markets. In this paper we devote our attention to the implications of capital mobility for domestic and international labor markets by proposing an empirical test on the FDI and unemployment nexus. The test is based on a simple multi-industry model with unemployment due to search frictions.
Integrated capital markets facilitate the study of foreign direct investment and its effects on equilibrium unemployment. The outcome of the model is different from previous studies in that the effect is ex-ante ambiguous and highly depends on whether a country is the FDI receiving or sending country.
The intuition behind that result is that FDI directly affects intermediates (labor) demand at the extensive margin through endogenous adjustments of capital costs.
The adjustments in production costs trigger an expansion of the FDI receiving country's range of active industries through the increased competitiveness in industries located close to the former cutoff. This boosts demand for intermediates and thus reduces equilibrium unemployment.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first focusing on the unemployment effects of global sourcing in a model with a continuum of industries from both an empirical and a theoretical perspective. Lin and Wang (2008) Also closely related to this paper are two contributions by Mitra and Ranjan (2007) and Davidson, Matusz and Schevchenko (2008) 
Theory
The model employed to study potential labor market effects of FDI is an extended version of the Hanson (1996, 1997 ) general equilibrium trade model with search friction a là Pissarides (2000) in the labor market. One modification of the original Hanson (1996, 1997) model is that the production of the continuum of final consumption goods takes place on two different levels.
Final goods are assembled using intermediate inputs and capital within each industry. Intermediates are produced by input of homogeneous labor only, which is a simplification of the original model that distinguishes between high-and lowskill workers. The main contribution to the literature is the micro-foundation of the wage-setting mechanism through search and matching and wage negotiation between employers and employees. Firms have to post vacancies in order to recruit new workers, and once met they bargain about wages. After a successful wagenegotiation the firm sets up shop and starts producing the intermediate good. 
where x(z) is the quantity of the good from industry z consumed and ϕ(z) is the Cobb Douglas share. 1 Aggregate demand evaluated by the price P must equal total expenditure Y P = E. Perfect competition and homothetic preferences implies that a fraction ϕ(z) of world expenditure is spent on consumption of good z.
Demand is thus determined by
which relates expenditure and revenue within industry z. Perfect competition implies that revenue in industry z equals quantity times unit costs, κ(z), so that the consumption and production side of the model is interacted through (2).
Final good producers. Intermediates are assembled to final goods within industries z. The assembling process requires capital provided by capital owners for some interest r. Industries are ordered according to the input coefficients a(z), which exogenously determine the requirement of intermediates needed to produce one unit of the consumption good z. Both countries specialize their production to certain industries with a comparative advantage by means of lower unit costs. Input coefficients in z are exogenously given by Ricardian technology parameters in 1 Summing up the shares over the whole continuum of industries must equal unity.
form of
where index i denotes domestic (d) or foreign (f ). The labor requirement curves comprise a country-specific component α and an industry-specific component γ that varies over the continuum. As in Dornbusch et al. (1977) To model final good production we postulate a Cobb Douglas production function
where a i (z) denotes the amount of intermediates used in industry z and k i (z) denotes capital needed to assemble the final good z. The final industry output good is sold for a price p(z). Perfect competition implies that the industry price level equals the respective industry unit costs The matching process m(θ i ) is a concave function of θ, the equilibrium market tightness. Due to its constant returns to scale properties, the matching function implicitly determines the probability of a successful match. The problem of the firm and worker can be expressed by standard Bellman equations that depend on firms' revenue, unemployment benefits b, the bargaining power β, vacancy posting costs c, the discount rate η, and job destruction rate λ. The solution to the problem of the worker and the firm is derived as in Pissarides (2000) 
The economy's total labor demand can be found by aggregating industry labor demand over the whole continuum of active industries as
wherez i and z i represents the upper and lower bound of the respective country's competitive industries. Search frictions give rise to unemployment, which is determined by the Beveridge curve that secures that flows into unemployment equal flows out of unemployment. The assumption that the matching technology is concave translates into a convex Beveridge curve so that
Intermediate goods' prices q are determined on the intermediate goods level of the model and depend on the equilibrium market tightness. Equation (2) allows us to simplify the Labor Market Condition (LMC) such that the equilibrium depends only on the endogenous parameters z and θ i as well as other exogenous parameters and reads
The standard Pissarides (2000) 
General Equilibrium
The general equilibrium requires a framework that pins down the endogenous parameters. To close the model income is normalized to unity and determined by adding up world factor payments to workers in and outside the pool of unemployed, which is given by
Capital rentals are determined using the Cobb Douglas shares and the capital market clearing conditions
Interest rates are such that capital markets are in equilibrium, conditional on simultaneous goods and labor market clearing. The equilibrium then depends on six endogenous variables: one home-and one foreign-market tightness, capital rentals in the foreign-and the home country, one cutoff that pins down the trade pattern between both countries, and income. Without loss of generality we can set world income as nummeraire by normalizing it to unity. A closed form solution of the model requires a determination of the optimal trade pattern between both countries. This trade pattern also determines the amount of capital required to produce for both home and foreign demand of final goods produced within active industries.
Corollary 1. The trade pattern between both countries hinges on one unique cutoff z * ∈ (0, 1) satisfying
The pattern of trade depends on the country's comparative advantage. The fact that final good producers are price takers in addition to the result that intermediate good's prices and capital costs are equalized within but different across countries allows us to determine a cutoff industry for which both industries produce with same unit-costs. For a given equilibrium market tightness and a given capital rental the pattern of trade is solely determined by the Ricaridian differences in technology.
However, the micro-foundation of the wage setting mechanism and endogenous interest rates imply that countries can gain or loose a comparative advantage within certain industries if wages or capital cost change. A comparisons of unit costs is sufficient to determine the optimal comparative advantage pattern across countries.
The clear ordering of the continuum of industries according to intermediate goods requirements allows to solve the cutoff industry z * . In a two-country scenario one country supports demand for goods from industries in the continuum z ∈ [0, z * ]
and the other country supplies goods from z ∈ [z * , 1].
Comparative statics analysis
The unimpeded access to foreign financial markets allows capital owners to invest their capital in markets with the highest returns to capital. The model and the comparative static exercise conducted below thereby totally neglect the role of the government. Instead we focus on an initial scenario with frictionless capital markets but unequal capital rentals in the two countries studied. Starting from that initial disequilibrium we analyze how footloose capital-flows triggered by differences in international capital returns affect equilibrium unemployment. The adjustment process goes through the endogenous change in capital rentals, which influences production costs and thus the comparative advantage pattern across industries.
The effects of FDI on equilibrium market tightness. FDI in the form of capital inflows and outflows necessarily induce interest rate readjustments so that the capital clearing conditions are in equilibrium again. Capital inflows for instance reduce the scarcity of capital and thus precipitate a reduction in interest rates, which has a decreasing effect on unit costs. Given that all other factor prices remain constant, the unit cost function shifts down associated with lower final good prices over the whole continuum. The opposite happens in the country that looses capital. Suppose that capital flows from Foreign to Home. Interest rates in the receiving Home country decrease, interest rates at Foreign increase.
Suppose that z * pins down the FDI receiving country's upper, and the sending country's lower bound of active industries. The initial trade pattern is no longer optimal and the new intersection of the domestic and the foreign unit cost schedules is pinned down by z * > z * . The range of active industries contracts in the FDI-out economy and expands in the FDI-in economy. This implies that the former labor market equilibrium is not optimal any more: unemployment, wages and the equilibrium market tightness have to adjust.
In the following we distinguish between the adjustments at the extensive and intensive margin. At the extensive margin some industries get lost, which gives rise to a reduction in labor demand on the aggregate level. At the same time the adjustments of capital costs also directly affect the equilibrium by triggering a substitution between capital and labor. is the lower bound of active industries and z f = 1 is the fixed upper bound so that the first derivative of Γ R with respect to z * would be negative at Foreign.
In order to restore equilibrium labor supply must adjust too. Since labor demand in the FDI-out country decreases at the extensive margin, a higher rate of unemployment is needed to restore equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium market tightness must fall, wages go down and unemployment goes up. This in turn boosts labor demand on the individual industry level and strengthens the increase in labor demand on the intensive margin. Income adjustments do not matter in my setup since income is set as nummeraire. A formal proof can be found in the Appendix.
Empirical evidence
For the second part of this study, data from Bassanini and Duval (2009) 
Empirical strategy and data
where u it is total unemployment in country i at time t, α is a constant, and F DI The preferred estimator is a consistent fixed effects estimator including additional time dummies to control for trends common to all countries. To show that the results do not hinge on the estimation technique, additional random effects, and feasible least square models are employed. In a last step, endogeneity is addressed employing a diff-GMM estimator that treats F DI as endogenous variable.
Endogeneity concerns arise from the isolationist sentiments that stem from the perceived negative labor market effects of globalization. Such a negative perception may provoke protectionist tendencies which have to be taken into consideration during the analysis.
Generally speaking, the dimension of the data necessitates five-year averages in order to run diff-GMM regressions, which reduces the impact of short run fluctu- Various indices on labor market institutions available through the OECD were exploited to reduce the omitted variable bias caused by other unemployment-drivers.
Bassanini and Duval provide and discuss a data set that contains the most important variables. We control for tax wedge, replacement rate, employment protection (EPL), and union density 5 . Unfortunately the OECD stopped updating those variables so that labor market institutions are available for the period 1980 -2003 only, which is also determining the time dimension in our sample. An output gap mea-sure purge short run fluctuations from the data and further reduces the omitted variable bias from the regressions.
Results
Proposition (1) translates into a predicted negative sign of the net-FDI coefficient when regressing it upon unemployment.
The intuition behind this expected sign is that a negative coefficient indicates that a surge in net-FDI is negatively associated with unemployment. This result would be Benchmark results. Table ( 1) presents the benchmark regression results for the consistent fixed effects estimator. In a first step, the full set of available observations is employed without averaging the data, which leaves us more than 400 ob- Sign and significance remain and even the magnitude is rather stable. In a subsequent step we shed light on the role of labor market institutions in context of foreign direct investment. Regression (V) includes institutional measures on the degree of employment protection (EPL), the union density capturing the bargaining power of unions, the replacement rate and the tax wedge, as well as the output gap and product market regulations. We extend regression (I) so that all globalization controls other than the variable of interest are excluded again. The magnitude of the effect is slightly higher than that in regression (I) which can be due to the loss of observations 7 . As before the magnitude of the effect declines significantly when we also include openness and portfolio investment controls. However, labor market institutions have less explanatory power as indicated by the modest decline in R-square and the rather weak decrease in the coefficients of the other 7 Unfortunately the institutional variables contain missings.
variables included. Comparing regression (I) and (IV) we also find that coefficients for the output gap and FDI are higher when the labor market institution controls are included. In regression (VI) all controls and additional macroeconomic shocks are included which yields insignificant results for net-FDI. However, interestingly we also find a positive and significant coefficient for the real interest rate shock.
This result is in line with the theory that suggests that capital costs are a potential channel variable between FDI and unemployment. Higher capital rentals trigger FDI-flows, thereby fostering unemployment.
To summarize the benchmark regression results based on the entire information available, without averaging the data, we find negative and significant coefficients suspicion. The non-averaged data yields a p-value exactly equal to zero, which is in stark contrast to the test statistics reported in Table ( 2). Put differently taking five-year averages improves the quality of the instruments as expected. But before we turn to the detailed discussion of the GMM-results we first rerun the benchmark fixed effects regressions from Table (1) . Table ( Robust standard errors in parentheses, *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Data is available for 19 OECD countries. Time dummies included in all regressions. Fixed effects preferred for the benchmark specification according to the Hausman test. In (IV) we treat openness, output gap, and net-FDI as endogenous. In (V) we exclude openness from the set of endogenous regressors but treat FDI-net and output gap as endogenous.
Regression (I) replicates regression (I) from
a one standard deviation increase in net-FDI reduces unemployment by roughly 0.8 percentage points. Regression (II) includes the institutional controls which increases the magnitude of the effect to a 1 percentage point reduction in a one standard deviation of net-FDI. Controlling for financial integration and openness yields results which are very much in line with (II). We then devote attention to the endogeneity problem in that we generate instruments using lagged variables of the potentially endogenous regressors in a diff-GMM regression setup. The model in (IV) treats net-FDI, the output gap, and openness as endogenous. The performance of the instruments is rather good compared to the results obtained for the non-averaged data. The test on first and second order autocorrelation between the instruments and the error term yields p-values equal to 0.037 and 0.417, and the Sargan test does not reject the null hypothesis but is still below 0.5. The intuition behind the endogeneity problem is that policy makers could be influenced by a surge in unemployment. This could encourage them to increase barriers to international capital and trade flows so that trade openness is also a potential sources for endogeneity. Regression (V) excludes openness from the set of endogenous regressors as a robustness check. All setups yield the same robust finding. FDInet and openness is negative and significant supporting the robustness of our main result. Moreover, we also find that portfolio investment is positive and significant which further supports our story by indicating that more financial market integration with investors holding foreign portfolio assets having the same effects as FDIoutflows. However, the finding is interesting but not robust given that it only appears in the GMM regressions. FGLDS in (VIII) also yields comparable results.
Conclusion
This paper advances a simple multi-industry trade model a là Dornbusch et al. GDP from the Penn World Table 6 .4 was used to construct FDI-net intensities.
Inward-FDI are investments from abroad into the reporting country. FDI-outflows denotes FDI from the reporting country to other countries. Job Creation J denotes the present discounted value of expected profit from an occupied job in skill group k. The value of a vacant job is denoted by V . V depends on vacancy posting costs (c evaluated at a common price p) and the difference between the value of taking the job and the opportunity costs of filling the job.
The value generated by a successful match is revenue of the intermediate good producer minus variable production cost. The value of the job can be destroyed by an exogenous shock, λ, that hits the firm with poisson arrival rate λ.
Optimal vacancy posting by the firm implies that the value of vacancies V is zero in equilibrium.
Interaction of both equilibrium conditions yields the Job Creation condition
which states that revenue equals variable production and recruitment costs. It will be shown that all intermediate good producers pay the same wage to the homogeneous workers. Final good producers however do differ with respect to unit costs/prices due to differences in input requirements amongst final good producers producing in different industries.
Wage Curve From a worker perspective, the job is worth the wage received as compensation for her effort minus the opportunity cost of forgone outside opportunities. However, the firm a worker is employed for can be destroyed with a certain probability. The value of the job will be destroyed so that the worker is left with her outside option, which is worth ηU . This outside option comprise unemployment benefits b and the value of a successful reemployment.
W e is expected value of a job. By introducing W e we take into account that workers are randomly matched to firms and therefore have to build expectations about W .
This also implies that all firms pay the same wage rate and therefore only differ with respect to their production given the equilibrium wage. See Dutt et al. (2009) for further discussion.
Wages itself are bargained and satisfy
This implies
and
In the end we obtain an aggregate wage equation
Which is the pendant to the labor supply curve in the standard Feenstra and Hanson model.
To solve for the job creation curve equation (17) and (16) are combined so that
which can be rearranged to equation (18) . To solve for the wage curve we start with rearranging equation (21) as
where we can substitute for J using equation (16) 
Rearranging equation (19) 
The outside option is obtained by solving equation (20) 
Combining equation (26), (29), and (30) gives
To solve for the equilibrium intermediate good price we can interact the wage curve (24) and the job creation curve (18) and solve for (z) 
Simplifying then yields
We can substitute the common price index by q i due to the assumption that vacancy posting costs are paid in terms of the intermediate good. Moreover, due to perfect competition and the small firm assumption, the intermediate good producer's revenue must equal the price paid by the final good producers so that (z) = q i must hold in equilibrium. Therefore, all final good assemblers pay the same price for intermediate goods denoted q(z) so that q(z ) = q h (z ) for z = z . Prices only depend on exogenous parameters and the equilibrium market tightness, which is common to all firms in all industries.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, notice that the left hand of the LMC curve Γ L is well behaved due to the convexity of the Beveridge curve. For lim θ→∞ Γ L = L since lim θ→∞ u(θ) = 0. Let the equilibrium market tightness go to zero and we find that lim θ→0 Γ L = 0 since lim θ→0 u(θ) = 1. Thus, for θ = 0 we have full unemployment and no worker is willing to search for a job.
The right hand side of the LMC curve is also well behaved. Demand for inter- Proof of Proposition 1. The first part follows immediately from the first derivative of Γ R with respect to z * . Notice, that for each country we ex-ante know whether z * is the upper or lower bound. In the two country scenario both countries have one constant bound (either 0 or 1) and one variable bound z * . So it is important to determine whether z * is the upper or lower bound for each country, which depends on the regarded country's comparative advantage. For the moment we assume that home has a comparative advantage in the production of goods closer to 0 and foreign has a comparative advantage in the production of goods closer to 1, determined by the assumption about the exogenously given technology a(z) where we assume that a d (1) > a f (1) and a d (0) < a f (0). For the home country z * is therefore the lower bound of active industries. Changing the bounds and deriving the first derivative with respect to z * therefore yields
for the FDI-receiving home country and
for the FDI-sending foreign country. An increase in the cutoff industry thus reduces labor demand at the extensive margin due to a reduction in active industries.
The second part follows from Lemma 2, which is necessary to proof Proposition (1). The assumption that interest rates are endogenously determined implies that capital flows must be compensated by a change in interest rates. Capital outflows for instance makes capital more scarce. The reduction in supply therefore must be compensated by a readjustment in capital cost. Suppose that everything else remains equal for the moment. Such an increase in capital cost shifts the unit cost curves upward. The reverse applies for the capital inflow country where the increases capital supply will shift the unit cost curves downward. The former cutoff z * cannot be optimal anymore and must change. The capital outflow country loose its comparative advantage in some industries close to the former cutoff and the capital inflow country will extend its production to industries formerly associated to the outflow country and z * will readjust. Proposition 1 immediately implies that Γ R in the outflow country will fall and Γ L in the inflow country will rise. To restore equilibrium, wages and thus unemployment have to readjust so that Γ L = Γ R again.
Wages and thus intermediate good prices in the outflow country must decrease and wages in the inflow country must increase.
